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TIME FOR CONGRESS TO SPREAD LOVE IN THE AIR:
WHY THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT WAS WRONG
BEFORE, AND WHY IT DESERVES REPEAL TODAY
JENNIFER C. WANG*
I. INTRODUCTION
HAoEN SOUTHWEST AIRLINES opened for business thirty-
four years ago, one of its first advertisements featured the
slogan, "How do we love you? Let us count the ways."' Back
then, there were only three ways. 2 The low-fare pioneer served
just three cities, and the advertisement took its play on words
from the name of Southwest's home base at Dallas' Love Field
Airport. Today, Southwest carries more passengers across the
skies of America than any other airline3 and spreads its low-cost
airfares to fifty-nine cities in thirty-one states.4 But if you want to
fly to or from Southwest' s home base in Dallas, you're limited to
just sixteen cities in Texas and a few surrounding states.5 This
means that, for the most part, the love and low fares that South-
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; M.S. Columbia University Graduate
School of Journalism;J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law (May 2006). I
would like to thank Professor Tom Mayo for his suggestions on this comment and
his invaluable mentorship. I would also like to thank my husband, Chad, for his
support and encouragement.
I Southwest Airlines Advertisement Copy, at http://www.southwest.com/
images/ad-gallery/p-adOl.jpg (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
Southwest flew from Dallas to Houston and Sari Antonio. See id.
3 Southwest is the nation's largest airline measured by total domestic passen-
gers carried. See Vikas Bajaj, Southwest Creeping onto D.C. Radar Airline May Raise Its
Lobbying Profile to Fight Wright Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 5, 2004, at D1.
4 See Southwest Airlines' Fact Sheet, at http://wwv.southwest.com/about-swa/
press/factsheet.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). On January 13, 2005, Southwest
announced it will service 11 more cities through a code-sharing arrangement
with ATA Airlines, a right Southwest obtained by acquiring some of ATA's assets
in bankruptcy. Micheline Maynard, From Aw-Shucks to Cutthroat: Southwest's Ascent,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at 37.
5 See Southwest Airlines' Interactive Route Map, at http://www.southwest.
com/travel-center/routemap-dyn.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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west has spread across the nation do not apply to flights into and
out of Dallas' Love Field.
A quirk of federal legislation called the Wright Amendment
created this ironic tether, keeping Southwest from freely flying
from its own home base. Named after Jim Wright, a former
speaker of the House from Fort Worth, the Wright Amendment
was passed in 1979 to protect a then-young Dallas/Fort Worth
International Airport ("D/FW") from competition at Love
Field.6 The law prohibited carriers from flying to any point
outside of Texas, or its four border states (Louisiana, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, and New Mexico), unless the aircraft carried no
more than fifty-six passengers.7 The Amendment guaranteed a
monopoly for long-haul flights at D/FW and flew in the exact
6 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (the amendment has never been codified) [herein-
after Wright Amendment].
7 In its entirety, the Wright Amendment provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), notwithstanding any other
provision of law, neither the Secretary of Transportation, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, nor any other office or employee of the United
States shall issue, reissue, amend, revise, or otherwise modify (ei-
ther by action or inaction) any certificate or other authority to per-
mit or otherwise authorize any person to provide the transportation
of individuals, by air, as a common carrier for.compensation or hire
between Love Field, Texas, and one or more points outside the
State of Texas, except (1) charter air transportation not to exceed
ten flights per month, and (2) air transportation provided by com-
muter airlines operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of fifty-
six passengers or less.
(b) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (c), notwithstanding
any other provision of law, or any certificate or other authority
heretofore or hereafter issued thereunder, no person shall provide
or offer to provide the transportation of individuals, by air, for com-
pensation or hire as a common carrier between Love Field, Texas,
and one or more points outside the State of Texas, except that a
person providing service to a point outside of Texas from Love
Field on Nov. 1, 1979, may continue to provide service to such
point.
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect to, and it is
found consistent with the public convenience and necessity to au-
thorize, transportation of individuals, by air, on a flight between
Love Field, Texas, and one or more points within the States of Lou-
isiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas by an air car-
rier, if (1) such air carrier does not offer or provide any through
service or ticketing with another air carrier or foreign air carrier,
and (2) such air carrier does not offer for sale transportation to or
from, and the flight or aircraft does not serve, any point which is
outside any such State. Nothing in this subsection shall be con-
strued to give authority not otherwise provided by law to the Secre-
WRIGHT AMENDMENT
opposite direction of all other Congressional efforts at the time
to deregulate the airline industry and foster competition. 8 The
Wright Amendment does not protect the regional economy, as
local officials assert. Instead, it protects the monopoly on long-
haul air travel at D/FW, dominated by American Airlines. This
lack of airline competition hurts the overall economy of the Dal-
las/Fort Worth region, and it hurts consumers nationwide.
From the moment of its passage through today, the Wright
Amendment has run contrary to public policy and America's na-
tional agenda of encouraging air travel competition. The
amendment should never have passed, and Congress should
correct its error by repealing the measure.
This comment provides several grounds to justify a Congres-
sional repeal of the Wright Amendment. Part II outlines the
historical background of the Wright Amendment, including an
examination of the events leading to its passage and the legal
challenges that ensued. Part III explores the federal issues in-
volved in the amendment, including the constitutionality issue,
deregulation policies and perimeter-rule exceptions. Part IV ex-
amines the more recent efforts to expand air service out of Love
Field. Finally, Part V analyzes the detrimental effects of the
Wright Amendment and the national, as well as local, interests
that will benefit from the law's repeal.
II. BACKGROUND
The cities of Dallas and Fort Worth grew up just thirty-one
miles apart and in the 1960s, became locked in what has been
described as an "intense" and "bitter" airport rivalry, which re-
sulted from the operation of separate airports just twelve miles
tarv of Transportation, the Civil Aeronautics Board, any other
officer or employee of the United States, or any other person.
(d) This Section shall not take effect if enacted after the enactment
of the Aviation Safety & Noise Abatement Act of 1979.
8 Wright Amendment, supra note 6, at § 29(a)-(d). The Shelby Amendment,
passed in 1997, added Kansas, Alabama and Mississippi to the list of states where
carriers may fly directly from Love Field. Department of Transportation & Re-
lated Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-66, § 337, 111 Stat.
1425, 1447 (1997) [hereinafter Shelby Amendment]. For the purposes of this
comment, reference to the Wright Amendment incorporates the Shelby Amend-
ment provisions as well.
In addition to the International Air Transportation Competition Act, Congress
also passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat.
1705 (1978) (codified in various sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the Airline
Deregulation Act ("ADA")].
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away from each other.9 In 1964, to eliminate the inadequate
and incomplete service at each airport, as well as the unneces-
sary expense for air carriers and area taxpayers, federal regula-
tors ordered the cities to build one regional airport between
them.'0 The cities' resulting agreement to construct D/FW In-
ternational Airport included a joint bond ordinance providing
for the project's financing and for the eventual phase-out of
commercial passenger flights at competing airports in the area,
including Dallas' Love Field.'"
The bond ordinance was adopted in 1968, and in 1970, the
eight airlines then servicing the region signed agreements to
move their operations to the new airport. 12 , Missing from the
group was start-up commuter airline Southwest, which got ap-
proval from state regulators to start flying from Love Field to
Houston and San Antonio in 1971.' After Southwest formally
notified the new regional airport board that it intended to stay
at Love Field, the two cities.sued the airline.' 4 The cities con-
tended, among other points, that permitting Southwest, or any
other carrier, to operate at Love Field threatened the financial
security of the new regional airport by diverting air traffic to
Love Field.' 5 However, the federal district court pointed out
that, under the bond arrangements of both airports, "any reve-
nue generated at Love Field by Southwest Airlines defrays the
costs and expenses of the Regional Airport."' 6 The court found
that the cities had no authority to deny use of Love Field, re-
gardless of fears over economic necessity. 17 The court held that,
"so long as Love Field [remained] open as an airport," the cities
could not exclude Southwest from it.' 8 The Fifth Circuit agreed
and affirmed the decision upon appeal. 9 Further attempts to
9 See City of Dallas v. S.W. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Tex.
1973), affd 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974).
10 Id. at 1019-20.
11 Id. at 1020.
12 Id. at 1020-21.
13 Id. at 1021.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1025.
16 Id. DFW had an obligation to finish paying off Love Field bonds, but no
money would be diverted away from DFW to pay off those Love Field bonds so
long as Love Field generated sufficient revenue of its own. Id. Thus, the court
concluded, any revenues accrued through Southwest's presence at Love Field ac-
tually benefited DFW by preventing funds from being diverted to Love Field. Id.
17 Id. at 1026.
18 Id. at 1035.
19 City of Dallas v. S.W. Airlines Co., 494 F.2d 773, 775 (5th Cir. 1974).
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prohibit Southwest from operating at Love Field resulted in an-
other court judgment from the Fifth Circuit in 1974, holding,
conclusively, that resjudicata dictated that the prior decision per-
mitting Southwest's operation should stand. 2' That same year,
the long-awaited D/FW opened for business, immediately be-
coming the region's primary and dominant airport.21 For sev-
eral years, Southwest operated its strictly-intrastate commuter
flights out of Love Field without further turbulence.
Then, in 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act,
aimed at removing government control and fostering competi-
tion in the airline industry.22 The relaxed regulations led South-
west Airlines to apply for the right to start a Love Field-to-New
Orleans route, which the Civil Aeronautics Board granted.2"
The move alarmed city officials in Dallas and Fort Worth, who
feared deregulation would lead Southwest and other airlines to
offer more service outside of Texas from Love Field and divert
business away from D/FW.24 In response to these concerns, the
powerful Speaker of the House from Forth Worth, Jim Wright,
quietly attached the amendment now named after him to the
tail-end of the larger International Air Transportation Competi-
tion Act of 1979.25 As one court saw it, Wright hid a provision of
"a distinctly parochial, domestic nature" within "the bowels of
that internationally oriented measure to protect D/FW from
competition."26 The law, often called a "compromise" between
20 S.W. Airlines Co. v. Tex. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 103 (5th Cir. 1977).
21 See History of DFW Airport, at http://www.dfwairport.com/visitor/his-
tory.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
22 See generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of § 105
Airline Deregulation Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 41713), Pertaining to Preemption of Authority
Over Prices, Routes, and Services, 149 A.L.R. FED. 299 (2005); see generally Alfred E.
Kahn, Airline Deregulation, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, available at
http://vuv.econlib.org/library/Enc/AirlineDeregulation.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2005).
23 The Civil Aeronautics Board was the predecessor to the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA"). SeeAm. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788,
793 (5th Cir. 2000).
24 Martin Zimmerman, Southwest, Love Field's Strong Ties Economics, Survival
Bring Two Together, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Jan. 8, 1989, at Hi.
25 A search of newspaper archives from the time revealed no public reporting
on the measure, but Southwest Airlines executives later said that they fought
against its passage. See One-on-One with Herb Kelleher, DALLAS MAGAZINE, March 1,
1986, at 18. The Wright Amendment provisions are found in the very last section
of the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979. Wright
Amendment, supra note 6; see also Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843
F.2d 1444, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
26 Cont'l Air Lines, Inc., 843 F.2d at 1446.
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the parties, allowed Southwest to continue flying to New Orleans
from Love Field, but it effectively cut off any further expansion
of service from Love Field to the four states surrounding
Texas.27
The law stood unchallenged for a decade,28 until an airline
passenger sued to have the law declared unconstitutional.29
Plaintiff Buddy Cramer's suit alleged the Wright Amendment vi-
olated his right to interstate travel.3 ° Cramer further alleged
that the amendment infringed upon his free-speech rights by
limiting the information he was allowed to receive from airlines
at Love Field.31 Beyond anchoring the airlines at Love Field to a
four-state service area, the Wright Amendment also prohibits
airlines from offering information to consumers on flights con-
necting outside that area.32 The Fifth Circuit found that a law
violates the right to interstate travel only if it actually deters such
travel.33 The court held that, because Cramer was free to travel
nationally through D/FW, or by taking a second flight from a
point outside the Love Field service area, the amendment did
not deter travel.3 4 The court also held that the government
could restrict the commercial speech of Love Field airlines be-
cause it was a reasonable restraint in light of the government's
substantial interest in providing "a fair and equitable settlement
for [the] dispute" between Dallas and Fort Worth.35
Following on the heels of Cramer, legislators from Kansas,
clamoring for the low fares of Southwest Airlines, also filed suit
to have the law overturned as unconstitutional.36 Like Cramer,
Kansas also asserted violations of the First Amendment right to
27 See full text of the Wright Amendment, supra note 7. Southwest Airlines
founder and Chairman Herb Kelleher described the provision as an unwanted
compromise he was forced to accept. One-on-One with Herb Kelleher, supra note 25.
28 In 1987, Dallas and Fort Worth unsuccessfully challenged Continental Air-
line's decision to start service from Love Field to Houston, because, unlike South-
west, the airline was an "interlining" carrier that could offer connecting service to
points outside of the Wright Amendment's restrictive borders. Cont'l Air Lines,
Inc., 843 F.2d at 1447.
29 Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1022 (5th Cir. 1991).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1033.
32 Id.; see also full text of the Wright Amendment, supra note 7.
3 Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1031 (emphasis added) (citing Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986)).
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1034.
36 Kansas v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (D.D.C. 1992), affd, 16 F.3d
436 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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receive information and the right to interstate travel.3 7 How-
ever, Kansas made one additional Constitutional argument, a vi-
olation of the obscure "Port Preference Clause,' '3 8 which will be
explored more fully in part III of this comment. Using language
similar to the Cramer court's, the D.C. District Court found the
Wright Amendment's limits on commercial speech a reasonable
means to achieve the government's interest of reducing air
travel at Love Field.' And similar to Cramer, the Court also held
that the Wright Amendment does not violate the fundamental
right to interstate travel, since it operates as only a "hinderance"
or "impediment" to those traveling out of Love Field. 4" Finally,
the court also rejected the Port Preference Clause argument. 41
Two years later, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's judgment.42
Unable to repeal the Wright Amendment through litigation,
Kansas legislators took the matter to Congress. In 1997, the
Kansas congressional delegation banned together with legisla-
tors of other states hungry for Southwest's service to push
through a new amendment on air travel from Love Field.43
With the help of Richard Shelby of Alabama (who headed the
Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee) and powerful Kansas politicians including then-
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, and then-White House cabi-
net member Dan Glickman (a former Congressman), Congress
passed the Shelby Amendment, which added Kansas, Alabama
and Mississippi to the list of states that airlines could serve di-
rectly from Love Field.44 Ironically, the law led Southwest to
launch service to Birmingham, Alabama, and Jackson, Missis-
sippi, but, to date, the airline has yet to offer service at any air-
port in Kansas.
Thus, through the efforts of a few key legislators, the Wright
and Shelby amendments locked Dallas-Fort Worth into a flight
37 Id. at 1048.
38 1d.
3) Id. at 1053-54.
40 Id. at 1052.
41 Id. at 1051.
42 Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
43 See Kansas Lawmakers Try to Repeal Restrictions on Dallas Love Field, THE JOUR-
NAL RECORD, Feb. 8, 1997.
44 Id.; see also Shelby Amendment, supra note 7.
45 Southwest does fly to and from Kansas City International Airport, located
just across the Kansas state line in Missouri. See Southwest Airlines Interactive
Route Map, supra note 5.
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pattern uniquely different from the rest of America's unregu-
lated air-travel markets. The courts, ceding to Congress' vast
powers in commerce and aviation, have allowed the provisions
to stand without strong scrutiny. Because Congress does have
tremendous power to legislate in aviation matters, it should take
a closer look at the Wright Amendment and reconsider its
validity.
III. FEDERALISM ISSUES
Federalism lies at the heart of every court decision that has
left the Wright Amendment virtually undisturbed over the de-
cades. The federal government's superior right to set policies
that pervade state lines gives Congress both the power and the
responsibility to ensure that such laws are Constitutional and
consistent with other federal mandates. This section of the com-
ment looks at issues of federalism and presents Congress with
three major arguments for invalidating the Wright Amendment.
A. PORT PREFERENCE CLAUSE
When Kansas sued to repeal the Wright Amendment,4 6 it
presented an unusual Constitutional argument involving a little-
known provision called the Port Preference Clause.47 The Port
Preference Clause prohibits government regulation from giving
"preference" to the ports of one state over those of another.4 8
On its face, the clause prohibits federal legislation, like the
Wright Amendment, that gives "preferences" to ports in one
state over those in another, by permitting, for example, flights
from Love Field to airports of only select states. Only the district
court and the court of appeals hearing the Kansas suit have ad-
dressed the effect of the Clause on the the Wright Amendment.
But those courts' rejections of the claim that the Wright Amend-
ment violates the Constitution on this ground are not disposi-
tive. And Congress should question the wisdom of retaining a
law with a potentially unconstitutional flaw.
46 Kansas vs. United States, 797 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 (D.D.C 1992), aff'd 16 F.3d
436 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 6.
48 Specifically, the Port Preference Clause provides: "No Preference Shall be
given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to Ports of One State over
those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from one State be obliged to
enter, clear or pay duties in another." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. The term
"port" has been interpreted to include airports. See City of Houston v. FAA, 679
F.2d 1184, 1196 (5th Cir. 1982).
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In the Kansas case, the challengers argued that the Wright
Amendment violated the Clause by establishing a direct prefer-
ence for the airports of the Enumerated states. 49 The D.C. Dis-
trict Court commended Kansas for making a "compelling
argument" that the Port Preference Clause was designed to pre-
vent "precisely this type of statute-one that discriminates on
the basis of states qua states. "50 But the court summarily rejected
that argument, finding that the "Port Preference Clause has
been rendered almost a historical nullity" because its terms had
never been used to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional.5'
Furthermore, the court noted that few court cases have impli-
cated the Clause, and the leading case on the Clause dated back
to 18562.5 In that case, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co., the Supreme Court interpreted the Clause narrowly, as
prohibiting discrimination between the ports of different states,
rather than between individual ports. 3 Adopting that view, the
D.C. Court of Appeals held that the Clause does not apply to the
Wright Amendment because only planes flying to or from Love
Field are required to stop at a point outside the five-state service
area, not planes flying to or from Texas, in general.54
Neither of the courts addressing the Kansas challenge gave
proper consideration to the goal of the Port Preference Clause.
And future legal attacks on the Wright Amendment could impli-
cate the Clause again for another court to consider. The Clause
can easily apply to the Wright Amendment upon examining the
intent of the Constitution's framers. When the framers decided
to include the Clause, they saw it as a check on the federal gov-
ernment's power to intrude upon state matters. 55 Specifically,
the framers wanted to prevent the federal government from dic-
tating to the states where ships must dock.56 The framers be-
lieved each state should have the right to establish ports
wherever the state saw fit, and to require ships to dock at certain
ports within that state.57 They worried that the federal govern-
ment might pass laws overriding the states' port policies in order
49 Kansas, 797 F. Supp. at 1048.
50 Id. at 1049, 1051.
51 Id. at 1049.
2 Id.
53 59 U.S. 421, 433-35 (1855).
54 Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
55 See 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 371-373 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph
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to dock its ships at the ports the federal government found most
convenient or least expensive.5" Further, the framers wanted to
prevent the federal government from requiring ships to pass
through federal jurisdictions so that it might collect more
taxes.59 In an era where shipping routes followed the path of
America's rivers, ships would necessarily pass through federal ju-
risdiction if they were forced to start or stop their journey in
certain states or ports. Those state ports would also benefit from
the taxing potential, thus the framers prohibited giving "prefer-
ence" to the ports of one state over another.6 °
From this Constitutional history, it seems clear that the fram-
ers intended to bar any federal legislation 6 1 that would limit or
dictate routes or ports of entry and departure. This interpreta-
tion of the Port Preference Clause leads to a natural conclusion
that the Wright Amendment violates the Constitution. Under
the Amendment, no carrier can fly freely to or from Love Field,
without being forced to stop at a state listed by the Wright or
Shelby amendments. Thus, all other airports without such a re-
striction, and those states not listed by the amendments, enjoy a
"preference" over Love Field and Texas. At a minimum, the
Constitutional validity of the Wright Amendment under the
Port Preference Clause is questionable. Congress has a duty to
uphold the Constitution, and so it should repeal the Wright
Amendment as a constitutionally unsound measure.
B. DEREGULATION AND PREEMPTION POLICIES
The Constitutional framers' concerns over federal port regula-
tion fit snuggly with modern Congressional concerns over airport
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 One of the framers explained the potential abuse of federal power this way:
suppose, for instance, the [federal] government should determine that all ships
which cleared or entered in Maryland, should clear and enter at George-Town,
on Potowmack [sic], it would oblige all the ships which sailed from, or were
bound to, any other port of Maryland, to clear or enter in some port in Virginia."
Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1778), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, at
372.
61 Early challenges based on the Clause implied that the provisions also ap-
plied to state regulations, since the language of the clause says "any regulation."
But the framers fully intended the Clause to apply only to Federal regulations.
Through another method of deducing intent, the Supreme Court held in 1886
that the provision applies only to federal, not state, regulations because it resides
within Article I of the Constitution, which governs the scope of congressional pow-




regulation and regulation in the aviation industry, as a whole.
Essentially, the framers wanted transportation carriers to be free
to choose their ports, based on their commercial needs or on
convenience. 2 Likewise, modern policies on transportation in
the aviation industry center around a deregulated model where
air carriers are free to choose their routes based on market
forces. Thus, the mandates of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 ("ADA") 63 raise another federalism issue worth consider-
ing in an analysis of the Wright Amendment: preemption. As a
federal legislation, the Wright Amendment cannot be pre-
empted, but the Wright Amendment runs counter to all other
federal aviation laws. The Amendment does for local officials
something they could not do for themselves under federal pre-
emption doctrines-grant a monopoly on long-haul air service
to the favored local airport. Not only is the granting of monop-
olies a poor policy, but so is the end-run around preemption
permitted by the Wright Amendment. Congress should not sup-
port such poor policy and should revoke the Wright
Amendment.
One key difference between the framers' views on port regula-
tion and our modern system lies in states' powers to determine
which ports carriers must use. The framers believed the federal
government should leave such regulations to the states.64 But,
to achieve uniformity in aviation rules, Congress has preempted
states' powers to enact such rules. And while the Wright Amend-
ment has survived several legal attacks, the courts' analyses in
those cases make it clear that locally-adopted flight restrictions
of the same kind would be preempted by federal aviation policy.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal laws
preempt state laws whenever the two authorities conflict with
each other.6 5 In other words, where a state or local law stands
contrary to Federal legislation, the Constitution resolves the im-
passe by placing federal policies ahead of local concerns. Pre-
emption generally takes two forms: (1) conflict preemption,
where federal law nullifies a directly-conflicting local law; and
(2) field preemption, where federal legislation so completely
and pervasively dominates an entire field that local governments
62 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, at 172.
63 ADA, supra note 8, at § 105.
64 See 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSrrUTION, at 371.
65 See generally 16A. Am. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 244 (2004); see also U.S.
CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
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cannot regulate within the same field.6 6 Perhaps no field is so
pervasively dominated by federal regulation as aviation. And the
ADA expressly preempted any local rules "relating to rates,
routes, or services of any airline."67 Congress wanted "maximum
reliance on competitive market forces, and on actual and poten-
tial competition," to bring "efficiency, innovation, and low
prices," as well as variety and quality to the air travel industry.6"
Thus, the express preemption provision in the ADA was passed
"to ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation
with regulation of their own."69
The ADA preempted more than just direct state regulations
on the rates airlines may charge, the routes they may fly and the
services they may offer. As the Supreme Court interpreted the
Act, state enforcement of any law relating to rates, routes, or ser-
vices includes actions having a "connection with or reference to air-
line 'rates, routes, or services.'"70 Using that standard, the
Supreme Court in 1992 said states could not attack airline adver-
tising and marketing practices through enforcement of state
consumer protection statutes.71 In that case, Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., the attorney generals of several states
adopted a set of national guidelines on the advertisement of
airfares.7 2 The guidelines imposed standards for everything
from the size and type of font used to advertise fares, to use of
words like "sale," unless the price is "substantially below the
usual price for the same fare with the same restrictions."73 The
66 See 16A. Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 65, at § 244.
67 All of the courts referring to the ADA in part III of this paper cite to the
ADA as it was passed in 1978. ADA, supra note 8. The courts use the statute
language as it then existed. A subsequent 1994 amendment, Pub. L. No. 103-305,
108 Stat. 1569 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2004)), changed the wording
from "rates, routes, or services" to "price, route or service," among other minor
changes. Specifically, the current languages states:
Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivision
of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or
enforce law, regulation, or other provision having the force and
effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that
may provide air transportation under this subpart.
49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b) (4) (A) (West 2004). In the interest of conforming to the
courts' opinions, this comment will use the statute language cited by the court,
since the changes are not relevant to the legal analysis at issue.
68 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101(a) (West 2004).
69 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
70 Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 388-91.
72 Id. at 378.
73 Id. at 388.
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Court concluded that the guidelines relate to airline rates, and
could not be enforced, particularly since they posed a significant
negative effect upon airfares by creating disincentives for air-
lines to advertise. 4
Using that same standard for ADA preemption, the Supreme
Court held in 1995 that Illinois could not permit its citizens to
sue an airline under the state's Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act.75 The case was brought by a group of
Illinois residents who participated in American's frequent flyer
program.76 The Supreme Court held that their suit against the
airline for retroactively changing the terms of the program was
prohibited if brought under the state fraud statute.77 The Court
did leave the plaintiffs with the option of bringing private con-
tract claims against American, because that would involve no
state action. 78 From these cases, Congress should see that even
arguably-tangential state actions related to airline rates, routes,
or services are inconsistent with the nation's laws on aviation.
Congress should repeal the Wright Amendment's brazen ban
on routes for carriers at Love Field, because it juts out as an
undesirable, anti-competitive anomaly from our national avia-
tion policies.
Through the ADA, Congress aimed to provide better trans-
portation services to consumers by strengthening "competition
among air carriers [and] ... to prevent unreasonable concentra-
tion in the air carrier industry. ' 79 And by many measures, the
ADA did just that. Between 1976 and 1996, the average airfares
passengers paid dropped forty percent in real, inflation-adjusted
terms.8" Airlines grew more efficient, filled more seats per
plane, and added more routes-giving consumers thirty percent
more carriers to choose from than they had before deregula-
tion."' But while Congress pushed for competition, a few legisla-
tors with local ties to Dallas-Fort Worth managed to sneak in the
highly-restrictive and anti-competitive Wright Amendment. By
all accounts, the measure was clearly and unabashedly designed
74 Id.
75 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222-28 (1995).
76 Id. at 224.
77 Id. at 226-29.
78 Id. at 228-29.
79 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101(f).
"0 Steven A. Morrison, Airline Deregulation and Fares at Dominated and Slot-Con-
trolled Airports, Address at Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciay 2 (Nov. 5,
1997).
S, See id. at 1-2.
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to protect D/FW from competition, even though the then-five-
year-old airport had already established itself as the primary,
dominant airport of the region. Today, the Amendment bucks
federal deregulation policies even more flagrantly. D/FW has
grown into the third-busiest airport in the world, with the largest
airline in America, American Airlines, monopolizing eighty-two
percent of the outgoing flights.8 2 Consequently, the Wright
Amendment has created precisely the result Congress intended
to avoid when it passed the ADA, which was to prevent "unrea-
sonable industry concentration, excessive market domination,
monopoly powers, and other conditions that would tend to al-
low at least one air carrier or foreign air carrier unreasonably to
increase prices, reduce services, or exclude competition in air
transportation. '' 3 Instead of permitting a few legislators and a
powerful airline company to carve out anti-competitive protec-
tions, Congress should insist upon a truly and fairly deregulated
air travel industry by repealing the Wright Amendment.
C. PERIMETER RULES
Some advocates of the Wright Amendment support their posi-
tion by noting that Congress and the courts permit perimeter
rules to restrict flights at two other airports, New York's LaGuar-
dia Airport and Washington, D.C.'s National Airport (also com-
monly called "Reagan National"). At LaGuardia, carriers cannot
provide non-stop flights to or from the airport within a 1,500-
mile perimeter.8 4 At National, carriers cannot provide non-stop
flights within a 1,250-mile perimeter.8 5 Both perimeter rules
were designed to decrease overcrowding at the respective air-
ports by diverting some traffic to larger nearby airports like Ken-
nedy, Newark, Dulles or Baltimore-Washington.8 6 But several
key differences distinguish the perimeter rules governing La-
Guardia and National from the Wright Amendment restrictions.
These include the entity imposing restrictions, the authority in-
voked to pass the restrictions, and the reasons for the restric-
82 Wade Goodwyn, Analysis: Southwest Airlines Challenges the Wright Amendment,
N.P.R. MORNING EDITION, Dec. 28, 2004.
83 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (a)(10).
84 W. Airlines, Inc. v. Port Auth., 817 F.2d 222, 223 (2d Cir. 1987).
85 Metropolitian Washington Airports Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3341 (codified at
49 U.S.C. § 49109). Prior to 1986, the perimeter extended only 1,000 miles. City
of Houston v. FAA, 679 F. 2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982).
86 W Airlines, 817 F.2d at 223; City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1188.
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tions. Thus, none of the case law upholding those perimeter
rules supports continued enforcement of the Wright Amend-
ment. This section draws distinctions, respectively, between the
National and LaGuardia perimeter rules and the Wright
Amendment. With each comparison, this section will examine
the court decisions upholding the perimeter rules, and show
why these seemingly similar restrictions do not support the
Wright restrictions.
First, the circumstances surrounding the passage of the pe-
rimeter rules at National and LaGuardia differ greatly from the
circumstances leading to the Wright Amendment's passage.
The FAA owns National Airport, as well as nearby Dulles Interna-
tional Airport. 8  The older, smaller National Airport lies just
across the Potomac River from the District of Columbia, and is a
quick Metro train ride away. The newer, larger Dulles Interna-
tional lies twenty-six miles west of D.C., which takes a forty-five-
minute car or bus ride to get to in good traffic.89 A third air-
port, Baltimore-Washington International, about thirty miles
north of D.C., also serves the region.9" The FAA enacted the
perimeter rule around National in 1981, because the airport's
convenience to D.C. travelers had put it over capacity. 9' At the
time of the rule's passage, National handled sixty-seven percent
of the air traffic in the greater-D.C. area, with 3,500 passengers
passing through each hour in peak times.92 A total of 17-million
passengers used the airport annually.93 This overcrowding went
unabated, and seemed destined to worsen, despite the fact that
the airport had long operated under an older 650-mile perime-
ter rule.94 That older rule made exceptions for seven cities, all
within 1,000 miles of the airport.9 5  Meanwhile, the newer,
larger Dulles Airport averaged fewer than 7,000 passengers per
87 Compare W Airlines, 817 F.2d at 223, and City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1188,
with Wright Amendment, supra note 6.
88 City of Houston, 679. F.2d at 1186.
8 Id. at 1186-87.
90 Id. at 1188.
91 Id. at 1186.
92 Id.
93 1d.
94 Id. at 1186-88. In fact, dramatic air-traffic increases seemed certain, because
the 650-mile perimeter rule was about to sunset. The approaching take-off of
that old restriction prompted the FAA to swoop in with the new perimeter rule.
Id.
,5 Id. The seven cities were: Minneapolis-St. Paul, St. Louis, Memphis, Or-
lando, Miami, Tampa and West Palm Beach. Id. at 1188 n.6.
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day.9 6 To ease the congestion at National and better distribute
air traffic in the region, the FAA set a cap of 17-million passen-
gers per year at National, the same number that had been pass-
ing through the airport, annually.9 7 The FAA also replaced the
pre-existing 650-mile perimeter rule and its exceptions with a
flat 1,000-mile perimeter rule.98 All of the seven cities that had
enjoyed the exception sat within the new 1,000-mile perimeter.9
Eliminating the inequity of the exceptions contained in the old
rule was one of the stated goals of the new rule. 100
These circumstances differ dramatically from the circum-
stances surrounding the Wright Amendment's passage. In es-
sence, the FAA merely prevented further concentration of flights
at National, by capping its passenger load at then-current levels.
If anything, the FAA expanded the service available at National by
replacing the 650-mile rule with exceptions with a flat, 1,000-
mile perimeter rule. Conversely, the Wright Amendment's pas-
sage involved no concerns over airport capacity, over-utilization,
or an over-concentration of flights at Love Field. In fact, in
1975, the year after D/FW opened (and five years before the
passage of the Wright Amendment), Love Field's annual passen-
ger count had already plummeted to a low of 457,212 from its
peak of 6,668,398 just three years earlier.'0 1 Furthermore, the
Wright Amendment's protectionist policy guaranteed a monop-
oly on long-haul flights at one airport, jointly owned by two cit-
ies, at the expense of another airport wholly owned by just one
of those cities. With National, even if the perimeter rule could
be characterized as "protecting" Dulles, the rule approached
nothing close to the grant of a monopoly on long-haul flights
there. Also, the federal government owned both airports, and
any benefit to one or detriment to the other weighs equally on
all the taxpayers of America.
In terms of the difference to consumers, the perimeter rules
at Dulles and LaGuardia do not go nearly as far as the Wright
Amendment, because the perimeter rules do not prohibit carri-
96 Id. at 1187.




10, Dallas Love Field Chronology of Events, at http://www.dallas-lovefield.




ers from offering connecting flight service.( "" This means that
long-distance passengers flying to National or LaGuardia must
accept a layover, but they do not have to change planes, buy
separate tickets, or re-check their bags.'""3 Conversely, the
Wright Amendment does not permit connecting flight service at
Love Field for any aircraft with more than fifty-six seats. 114 The
freedom to offer connecting service, allowing passengers to buy
one ticket and board one plane, played a part in the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision to uphold the perimeter rules at National. 1 5 The
Court noted that passengers could fly from any city into Na-
tional, so long as they endure a stopover within the 1,000-mile
perimeter,6 The Wright Amendment goes well beyond the
bounds of such a perimeter rule by banning airlines from even
offering connecting flights to points outside the restricted area,
and forcing intrepid passengers to ask for and to make two sepa-
rate flight arrangements.
Additionally, in upholding the National perimeter rule, the
Fifth Circuit pointed out that federal law grants the FAA power
to "control the use of navigable airspace of the United States
and the regulation of both civil and military operations in such
airspace in the interest of the safety and efficiency of both."' 7
The court reasoned that promoting the "efficient utilization" of
navigable airspace requires that the FAA regulate corridors of
air traffic and use of airports as well.'0 8 "The perimeter rules
help to accomplish that goal in the Washington area: by setting
up an orderly plan for the development of National and Dulles,
they aid in the efficient use of now-crowded airspace."" 9 Thus,
the court relied heavily upon the FAA's need to reduce air traf-
102 See City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1192.
103 See id.
104 See Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1455 (D.C. Cir.
1988). In 2000, a Fifth Circuit decision allowed airlines using aircraft with fewer
than fifty-seven seats to offer connecting service. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of
Transp., 202 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000). Southwest uses no aircraft meeting that
criteria. It employs a uniform fleet of Boeing 737s. However, Continental cur-
rently offers connecting service from Love Field by flying passengers on fifty-seat
regional jets through its hub in Houston.
115 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1192.
116 Id. The Court added that "no one has ever attempted completely to bar
travelers from distant cities from flying to National Airport. Such an attempt
might well give rise to a constitutional claim." Id. at 1192.
1117 Id. at 1194.
111 Id. at 1195.
I(19 Id.
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fic congestion as a justification for the perimeter rules. No such
justification exists for the Wright Amendment.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit did address the effect of the Port
Preference Clause on the perimeter rule.11 ° Following the Su-
preme Court's 1856 opinion that the Clause prohibited federal
discrimination "between the states," the Fifth Circuit held the
perimeter rule did not violate the Clause, because it "does not
discriminate against a named state or states. It does not declare
that Texans may not fly nonstop to National. Rather it sets a
limit of 1,000 miles on nonstop flights." '' The Court added
that some states straddle the perimeter line, and so any discrimi-
nation was the result of an "accident of geography," rather than
the intentional grant of a preference to one state over an-
other.' 12 This interpretation of the Port Preference Clause, if
applied to the Wright Amendment, could render the Wright re-
strictions unconstitutional, since specific states are named and
included within Love Field's "perimeter," while other states are
excluded in a seemingly preferential fashion. An even better
argument could be made that the Shelby Amendment violates
the Port Preference Clause, since Congress specifically added
Mississippi, Alabama and Kansas to Love Field's service area af-
ter those states lobbied extensively for inclusion.
At LaGuardia, concerns about overcrowding, similar to those
at National, led to the imposition of a formal perimeter rule.113
Like Washington, New York has three airports in close proximity
to each other-LaGuardia, Kennedy and Newark-with LaGuar-
dia being the smallest, oldest and historically more-regional air-
port.1 1 4 As with National, LaGuardia had already operated
under a perimeter rule, albeit an informal one with several ex-
ceptions." 5 But unlike at National, the formalized 1,500-mile
perimeter rule imposed at LaGuardia in 1984 reduced the per-
missible non-stop flight area, replacing the old, informal 2,000-
mile perimeter rule." 6 This led Western Air Lines, with its hub
in Salt Lake City nearly 2,000 miles away, to sue the Port Author-
ity, which owned all three airports in the region and imposed
110 Id. at 1196-98.
"] Id. at 1198.
112 Id.
13 See W Airlines, 817 F.2d at 222.





the rule to reduce congestion. 1 7 Western first argued that the
Airline Deregulation Act preempted the state from imposing
such rules because they clearly affected "routes and services."''"
The district court ruled that, even if the perimeter rule violated
the ADA, the ADA did not create a private right of action." 9
The court then proceeded to explain that LaGuardia's perime-
ter rule is not preempted by the ADA, because it falls within an
exception to the preemption provision. 20 The preemption ex-
ception cited by the court provided:
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to
limit the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof or
any interstate agency or other political agency of two or more
States as the owner or operator of an airport served by any air
carrier certificated by the Board to exercise its proprietary pow-
ers and rights. 121
The court ruled that the perimeter rules fell within the Port
Authority's "proprietary powers and rights," even though it ac-
knowledged that other courts recognized a proprietary power or
right only when local regulations targeted noise or other envi-
ronmental problems at airports. 22  Additionally, the court
noted the similarity between the Port Authority's actions at La-
Guardia and the FAA's actions at National, and concluded that
managing congestion within a multi-airport system fell within
the proprietary rights of the owner/proprietors of those multi-
airport systems.' 23 Specifically, the court stated that "in the ab-
sence of conflict with FAA regulations, a perimeter rule, as im-
posed by the Port Authority to manage congestion in a multi-
airport system, serves an equally legitimate local need and fits
117 Id.
118 Id. at 954.
19 Id. at 955. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings, and
referred to the lower court's analysis on the merits of Western's claim; accord-
ingly, this paper will discuss this case using the lower court's opinion. See W Air-
lines, 817 F.2d at 226.
120 W Airlines, 658 F. Supp. at 955-58.
12, A subsequent 1994 amendment, Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569 (codi-
fied at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (3)), changed some wording. Specifically, the cur-
rent languages states: "This subsection does not limit a State, political subdivision
of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States that owns or operates an air-
port served by an air carrier holding a certificate issued by the Secretary of Trans-
portation from carrying out its proprietary powers and rights." In the interest of
conforming to the courts' opinion, this comment will use the statute language
cited by the court, since the changes are not relevant to the legal analysis at issue.
122 W Airlines, 658 F. Supp. at 958.
123 Id.
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comfortably within that limited role, which Congress has re-
served to the local proprietor."'124
This decision (and its subsequent affirmation by the Second
Circuit) rests on faulty analysis, and does no more to support
the imposition of flight restrictions at Love Field than the Na-
tional Airport decision. The District Court in Western implied
that it had followed the Fifth Circuit's lead on perimeter rules,
but the court erred. This case is entirely distinguishable from
the National Airport case, on both facts and law. The Court
failed to give enough weight to those distinguishing factors and
incorrectly extended the boundaries of the proprietary-powers
exception to the ADA. While both the Port Authority and the
FAA are owner/proprietors of a multi-airport system, the FAA
has federal authority to regulate air traffic, where the Port Au-
thority does not. In fact, in the National Airport case, the Fifth
Circuit specifically held that the proprietary-powers exception
does not apply to the FAA. 125 The Fifth Circuit stressed that the
FAA's authority to impose perimeter rules lies strictly within its
status as the federal governing agency for aviation. 126 Referring
to the proprietary powers exception, the Court stated:
the statute . . . specifies that it deals with "the authority of any
State or political subdivision thereof or any interstate agency or
other political agency of two or more States as the owner or oper-
ator of an airport." The FAA does not fit within that definition.
Nothing could be more certain than that the restrictions of [the
ADA preemption provision] do not bind the FAA, an arm of the
federal government which just happens to own two airports. 127
So, by granting the Port Authority the right to impose perime-
ter rules, based on its status as the proprietor of a multi-airport
system, the Second Circuit completely misconstrued the Fifth
Circuit's decision. Thus, the Second Circuit wrongly redefined
the rights of airport proprietors under the proprietary-powers
exception. 12 Proprietors have no right to limit the routes and
services of airlines, except in very limited circumstances to allevi-
ate noise or environmental problems.
Thus, those who believe that the LaGuardia case somehow
supports the perimeter-like rules imposed by the Wright
124 Id.
125 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1194.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 The Supreme Court never reviewed the Second Circuit's decision in this
case. It denied certiorari. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth., 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
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Amendment are mistaken. As the Fifth Circuit noted, Congress
reserved an "'extremely limited role ... for airport proprietors
in our system of aviation management2 ... Why did Congress
specify such a limited role? To avoid interference with the pre-
eminent authority of the federal government in the field of avia-
tion."') Since the issue of proprietary powers does not apply to
the Love Field situation, Congress should not rely on the perim-
eter rules at LaGuardia as support orjustification for the Wright
Amendment restrictions. Additionally, because the Wright
Amendment restrictions had no basis in reducing air traffic con-
gestion or the efficient utilization of navigable airspace, the ra-
tionale supporting the perimeter rules at National also does not
apply to Love Field.
IV. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO BYPASS WRIGHT
In 1997, after the Shelby Amendment expanded Love Field's
service area to include Mississippi, Alabama and Kansas, a flurry
of competitive activity took off at Love Field. Aside from adding
states to the Love Field service area, the Shelby Amendment ex-
panded an exception that allowed planes with fewer than fifty-
seven seats to fly unrestricted. As the Wright Amendment was
initially interpreted, the exception applied only to commuter air-
craft designed to hold no more than fifty-six passengers. But the
expanded Shelby Amendment exception included any aircraft
with no more than fifty-six seats, whether originally designed
that way, or reconfigured to hold no more than fifty-six seats.131
The change sparked a period of competition at Love Field,
which in turn ignited a series of lawsuits involving multiple par-
ties, a Department of Transportation ("DOT") examination and
conflicting judicial judgments. 32  When the smoke finally
cleared from the firestorm of legal challenges three years later,
the competitive atmosphere at Love Field evaporated, even
though the airport gained some ground. The upshot of the law-
1,9 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1194.
130 Id. (quoting British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564 F.2d 1002, 1010 (2d. Cir.
1997)).
13, Specifically, the Shelby Amendment states: "the term 'passenger capacity of
fifty-six passengers or less' includes any aircraft, except aircraft exceeding gross
aircraft weight of 300,000 pounds, reconfigured to accommodate fifty-six or fewer
passengers if the total number of passengers seats installed on the aircraft does
not exceed fifty-six." See Shelby Amendment, supra note 7.
132 See generally Dallas Love Field Chronology, supra note 101; see also Am. Air-
lines, 202 F.3d at 794.
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suits was the clarification of several legal issues involving the
Wright Amendment.
In the three-year period between 1997 and 2000, new services
arrived at Love Field, while the lawsuits taxied slowly through
the courts. Southwest added service from Love Field to Missis-
sippi and Alabama. 13 3 Continental Express started flying from
Love Field to its hub in Houston, and it attempted to start non-
stop service from Love Field to Cleveland.13 1 Start-up airline,
Legend, ran non-stop flights from its new home base at Love
Field to Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Las Vegas, using
large, luxury jets reconfigured to hold just fifty-six seats and lots
of amenities.13 5 Continental Express announced similar plans to
offer service between Love Field and Cleveland on regional jets
with fifty-six or fewer seats. Delta also started flights at Love
Field, using regional jets with fewer than fifty-six seats to fly di-
rect to Atlanta. 136 Unwilling to stand on the sidelines, even
though it fought against expanded service at Love Field, Ameri-
can Airlines started flights from Love Field to Austin, and non-
stop flights to Los Angeles and Chicago on fifty-six-passenger
jets, while its legal challenges awaited adjudication. 137
The first suit, filed in 1997, went to state district court in Fort
Worth. 1 3  There, Fort Worth and American sued the City of
Dallas to force the city to block all the new service at Love Field
and won. 1 9 Dallas immediately appealed that decision, but also
filed a separate action of its own in federal court against Fort
Worth and the DOT, seeking declaratory relief "on essentially
the same issues involved in the state action."' 4 ° Dallas won
there, but American immediately appealed. 4 ' In between,
American sought and obtained an injunction to block Continen-
tal's non-stop flights to Cleveland. 4 2 Several of the parties asked
133 Southwest Airlines, A Brief History, at http://www.southwest.com/
about swa/airborne.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Southwest Air-
lines History]; Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 794-95.
134 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 794-95.
135 Id.
136 Id. Delta operated at Love Field through its Delta Connection carrier, At-
lantic Southwest Airlines ("ASA").
137 Id.
138 Id. at 795.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See Id. at 794; see also Dallas Love Field Chronology, supra note 101.




the DOT to step in and clarify what the Wright and Shelby
amendments would or would not allow. 4 ' When the DOT is-
sued its orders, more suits followed, until all of the claims were
consolidated in one appeal to the Fifth Circuit.144
Throughout the various cases, the same issues kept emerging.
In the end, the DOT issued an order with five parts, and the
Fifth Circuit upheld each of those orders, mostly embracing the
same conclusions as DOT. 45 First, the court addressed Fort
Worth and American's claim against Dallas for failure to enforce
the 1968 Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance.'46 The
bond ordinance required each city to "take such steps as may be
necessary, appropriate and legally permissible.., to provide for
the orderly, efficient and effective phase-out at Love Field ... of
any and all Certified Air Carrier Services, and to transfer such
activity to the Regional Airport."'14 7 The Fifth Circuit settled this
argument by holding conclusively that the ADA expressly pre-
empted local regulations like the bond ordinance, because it af-
fected the prices, routes and services of airlines.'48 The court
said preemption freed Dallas from any contractual obligations
to Fort Worth to enforce the bond ordinance.'4 9 The court also
said no proprietary-powers exception applied that would allow
Dallas to restrict flights. Specifically, the court held that the La-
Guardia and National Airport cases do not go so far as to grant
an airport owner proprietary power to allocate traffic between
two airports.15" Rather, the court interpreted those cases to
mean that proprietors can enact perimeter rules if the proprie-
tors articulate a need to alleviate noise, pollution or congestion;
none of which conditions applied to Love Field. 15
Second, the court upheld the DOT's interpretation that the
Wright Amendment's commuter aircraft exemption allows air-
lines to use jets for non-stop, long-distance flights, so long as
they hold fifty-six passengers or less. 152 Third, the court rejected
]I's Id.
144 Id. at 795-96.
145 Id. at 795.
146 Jd. at 804.
147 Id. at 793.
11 Id. at 804-08. Separately, DOT determined that the Wright and Shelby
amendments also preempt any city authority to restrict flight service differently.
Id. at 795.
149 See id. at 804-13.
1-,1 ld. at 807-08.
151 Id.
1' Id. at 808-10.
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a different contract claim by Fort Worth and American that the
D/FW Board must enforce agreements made between the
Board, the cities and eight airlines to move operations to D/
FW.11 3 The court found that, just as preemption would not al-
low the cities to regulate routes and services by local law, it also
would not allow them to do so by contract.154 Thus, even
though Continental was one of the original eight carriers that
had agreed to move its operations from Love Field to D/FW,
neither the cities nor the D/FW Board could keep Continental
Express out of Love Field. 155 Finally, the court upheld the
DOT's ruling that the Wright Amendment permits airlines using
fifty-six-passenger aircraft to offer connecting service. DOT in-
terpreted the fifty-six-passenger aircraft exception to mean those
aircraft are exempt from all of the Wright Amendment's regula-
tions.1 56 As a result, Continental Express gained the right to of-
fer its through service between Love Field and "the world" by
flying small regional jets with fifty-six or fewer seats through its
hub in Houston.157
These rulings appeared to widen the scope of service allowed
at Love Field. Indeed, such a clamor ensued for gate space at
Love Field after the rulings that Dallas ordered an airport analy-
sis to come up with a master plan for accommodating growth.
But that need soon diminished. The major carriers from D/FW
swooped into Love Field and virtually nullified the effect of the
court ruling by using their strength and dominance to drive out
the new services. American went nose-to-nose with Legend, of-
fering its own direct flights from Love Field to Los Angeles.
Delta offered direct flights to Atlanta, and Continental offered
direct flights to Cleveland. The Dallas Morning News summa-
rized the airlines' moves this way:
When start-up Legend Airlines began flights from Love Field to
Los Angeles and Washington in 2000, American, Continental Air-
lines Inc. and Delta started competitive operations at the air-
port . .. After Legend failed, American and Delta abandoned
Love Field, leaving only Southwest and Continental, which con-
153 Id. at 810.
154 Id. at 810-11.
155 Id. at 811.
156 Id. at 812-13.
157 Id. at 812.
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tinues to operate regional jet service to Houston Intercontinental
Airport. 151
With the world's largest airline as a competitor, it didn't take
long for Legend to fail. It started flying from Love Field April 5,
2000.151 It "declared defeat" and dropped out of the field nine
months later on December 2, 2000.160 American subsequently
terminated its direct flights to Los Angeles, and pulled out of
Love Field altogether after September 11th, 2001.16 Delta pul-
led out of Love Field in 2003.162 And while Continental still of-
fers connecting service through its hub in Houston, it no longer
offers direct flights from Love Field to anywhere outside the re-
stricted area. No airline offers such direct flights, perhaps, be-
cause the ailing industry can't afford to fly fewer than fifty-seven
passengers on a regular long-distance route, especially with
skyrocketing fuel prices. So even though the courts have per-
mitted a broad reading of the Wright Amendment, the reality is
that Love Field still operates under severe limitations.
In a move reminiscent of the Kansas effort to expand Love
Field's service area, Tennessee legislators joined forces in the
fall of 2004 to amend the Shelby Amendment by including their
state on the list of approved states.' 63 Like the legislators from
Kansas, Alabama and Mississippi, the Tennessee delegation
wanted greater competition at its airports,164 which for the other
states meant luring Southwest to offer service in those states.
What's unusual about Tennessee's effort is that Southwest al-
ready offers substantial services to Nashville's Airport-eighty ar-
rivals per day.' 6 5 But Tennessee lawmakers say they want the
benefits of even greater competition.' 66 In all likelihood,
they're seeking something dubbed by the DOT in 1993 as the
"Southwest Effect."' 67 The term refers to the impact of South-
158 Robert Dodge, Flights sought at Love, Tennessee lawmakers propose easing restric-
tions at airport, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 3, 2004, at D1.








167 See Randall D. Bennett & James M. Crain, The Airline Deregulation Evolution
Continues The Southwest Effect, Office of Aviation Analysis, Dep't of Transp. (May
1993), available for pdf download at http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=nav
client&ie=UTF-8&rls=GGLD,GGLD:2004-09,GGLD:en&q=southwest+effect
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west Airline's entry into a market. Studies show that Southwest
lowers airfare prices overall when it enters a market, and it low-
ers prices even more definitively on the routes it serves. 68 Both
Southwest and the Tennessee delegation say neither influenced
the other to push for changes to the Wright Amendment. 169 But
Tennessee's move in September 2004 prompted the latest
round of debates over the continued wisdom of flight restric-
tions at Love Field.1
7 0
Further fueling the debate was Delta's announcement in Sep-
tember 2004 that it would eliminate its hub operation at D/FW
and slash its daily flights by more than ninety percent as a part
of its corporate restructuring plan. 17 1 Delta held the number
two spot in operations at D/FW, behind American, but the
struggling airline cut the 254 daily flights it offered down to
twenty-one in January 2005.172 The airline also pulled out from
all but four of its nineteen exclusive-use gates at D/FW 73
Delta's decision put D/FW officials into a tailspin, but it also
presented them with the perfect opportunity to ask the most
profitable airline in the nation to leave Love Field, and its cum-
bersome flight restrictions, to slip in to Delta's gates at the un-
restricted D/FW. 7 4 Southwest considered that offer to take
Delta's gates. 75 But on November 12, 2004, it shocked and in-
censed officials at D/FW and American Airlines by announcing
that it would rather stay at Love Field and fight for repeal of the
Wright Amendment.17 6 "It's anti-competitive . . . the facility it
was designed to protect, Dallas/Fort Worth International Air-
port, no longer needs the law because it has become a powerful
"fortress hub" for American Airlines," said Gary Kelly, South-
[hereinafter DOT Study]; see also, Justin Ritter, Southwest Airlines: An In-Depth Re-
view, Chapter 8: The, 'Southwest Effect,' a graduate-seminar study by students at Em-
bry Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, Florida, available at http://
www.erau.edu/research/BA590/chapters/ch8.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
168 See DOT Study, supra note 167; Ritter, supra note 167.
169 Robert Dodge, supra note 158.
170 Eric Torbenson, Susanne Marta & Vikas Bajaj, Southwest Callingfor Repeal of
Wright Airline's Chief Ends Neutrality; Others Hail Law Protecting D/FW, DALLAs
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 13, 2004, at 1A.
171 Associated Press, Soon-to-be Vacated D/FW Gates Get Attention from Competitors,





176 See Goodwyn, supra, note 86; see also Torbenson, Southwest Calling for Repeal
of Wright, supra note 170.
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west's chief executive. 177 D/FW officials immediately responded
by saying "repeal would be detrimental, not only to this airport,
but to the entire North Texas economy."'17 D/FW later vowed
to make protection of the Wright Amendment (and, in effect,
protection of its monopoly), its "highest priority in the coming
Congressional term."'179 As expected, American Airlines, Fort
Worth officials and several other area politicians are vigorously
defending the Wright Amendment. Meanwhile, business lead-
ers, citizens of the region, and consumers nationwide are
mounting their opposition to the Wright Amendment's contin-
ued existence. The stage is set once more for a debate over the
Wright Amendment. This time, however, the issue has regis-
tered on the national radar, and Congress can ignore the
Amendment no longer. Three bills introduced in the summer
of 2005 seek to change or repeal the Wright Amendment. Sena-
tors John Ensign (R-Nev.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) have in-
troduced a bill to repeal the Wright Amendment in the Senate,
co-sponsored by four other senators.' s Representatives Sam
Johnson (R-Plano, Tex.) and Jeb Hensarling (R-Dallas) have
twenty-eight co-sponsors for a similar House bill."8 ' Finally, Rep-
resentative Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) introduced legislation
to add Tennessee to the list of states within the Love Field ser-
vice area. 8 2 Add to these bills, Southwest's new grass-roots cam-
paign to mobilize public support,8 3 and it seems increasingly
likely that Congress will be forced to address the inequities of
the Wright Amendment soon. Rather than bow to the interests
of a few powerful supporters of the Amendment, Congress
should examine the law's negative impact on the region, and on
the nation's aviation industry, and repeal what never should
have passed in the first place.
177 Torbenson, Southwest Calling for Repeal of Wright, supra note 170.
171 Id. (quoting Kevin Cox, D/FW's chief operating officer).
179 Bajaj, Southwest Creeping on D.C. Radar, supra, note 3.
180 S. 1424, 109thCong. (2005).
I'l H.R. 2646, 109th Cong. (2005).
8s2 H.R. 2932, 109th Cong. (2005). This bill re-introduces the same proposal
Tennessee lawmakers first made in 2004.
183 See Wright is Wrong! Set Love Free!, at http://www.setlovefree.com/
caseforrepeal.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
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V. TIME FOR REPEAL
Wright supporters have justified the Amendment as a neces-
sary protection to ensure D/FW's economic success.' 84 But such
legislative protectionism actually hinders economic growth for
the region and harms consumers nationwide. This section will
review the Wright Amendment's justifications and look at the
negative impact of the restrictions. In short, this section will
show why the time has come for a congressional repeal of the
Amendment.
A. D/FW's ECONOMIC SUCCESS
Whatever economic protection D/FW needed as a five-year-
old airport when Congress passed the Wright Amendment, it no
longer needs today. Sitting midway between the nation's two
coasts, D/FW has grown into the third-busiest airport in the
world for daily departures, and it ranks sixth in the world for the
number of passengers enplaned daily.' 85 D/FW has seven run-
ways, 132 gates and three control towers.' 86 In fact, officials
boast that its "immense landmass and facilities make D/FW the
only airport in the world able to land four aircraft simultane-
ously," and that the airport "can handle more operations than
any other U.S. airport under any weather condition.' 1 87 By con-
trast, Love Field Airport has but three runways, the newest one
commissioned in 1958.188 Southwest and Continental, the only
airlines currently operating at Love Field, use fewer than twenty
gates.' 89 D/FW serves nearly 54-million passengers annually,
while Love Field serves 5.6 million.190 By any measure, D/FW
has established an entrenched dominance that Love Field could
never threaten, not even if Congress repeals the Wright Amend-
ment. Yet Wright supporters claim that D/FW faces economic
184 See Torbenson, Southwest Calling for Repeal of Wright, supra note 170 (Charles
Boswell, Fort Worth City Manager, stating that "[s]trong competition for more
than regional activity out of Love Field could be detrimental to D/FW Airport.").
185 D/FW Airport, Airports Council International statistics, D/FW Airport 2003
Annual Report, available at http://www.dfwairport.com/airport/financials.html
(last visited Jan. 29, 2005) [hereinafter D/FW Airport 2003 Annual Report].
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See Dallas Love Field Chronology, supra note 101.
189 See id.
190 See D/FW Airport 2003 Annual Report, supra note 185 and Dallas Love
Field Facts, at http://www.dallas-lovefield.com/lovenotes/lovefacts.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 28, 2005).
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disaster if Congress should repeal flight restrictions at Love
Field. "'
D/FW officials say that the airport needs protection today for
several reasons. First, they argue that D/F needs help paying
for $2.7 billion of new debt issued in 2004 to fund a capital ex-
pansion project, including the construction of a new interna-
tional terminal. l92 Second, they say the airport will suffer from
Delta's plans to drastically reduce its operations at D/FW. 9 -3 Fi-
nally, they claim the airline industry as a whole "remains in an
economic tailspin" from the effects of the September l1th ter-
rorist attacks." 4 "The latest assault on the Wright Amendment
could not be more ill-timed to have a detrimental impact upon
D/FW," Kevin Cox, D/FW's Chief Operating Officer, said in a
press release.19 5 But industry consultants and analysts say that
D/FW officials are overreacting and hyping the impact of a
Wright Amendment repeal. "You have to remember that the
circumstances were even more difficult when the Shelby Amend-
ment passed [in 1997]," said Ed Faberman, President of the Air
Carriers Association, a trade group for discount airlines.' In
fact, the airline industry has never enjoyed much economic sta-
bility, constantly bumping along the turbulent skies of fierce
competition. And while airlines may fail, airports rarely go out of
business. The Dallas Morning News reported that economists
have long maintained that a repeal of the Wright Amendment
"would cause transitional but not long-term pain for D/FW," be-
cause Love Field simply can't compete at the same level. 9 7 One
economist flatly put it this way: "I don't see any threat to D/FW
if the Wright Amendment went away. Love Field doesn't have
the infrastructure, and it doesn't have the space to build the
infrastructure."' 9 8
19, See Statement of Fort Worth City Manager Charles Boswell ("Strong Compe-
tition for more than regional activity out of Love Field could be detrimental to
D/FW Airport," Torbenson, Southwest Calling for Repeal of Wright, supra note 170.
192 See Press Release, D/FW Int'l Airport Responds to Remarks by Southwest
Airlines CEO (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter D/FWI Press Re-
lease, Nov. 12, 2004].
193 See id. Delta, the number two carrier at D/FW, behind American, an-
nounced it would cut the 254 daily flights it offered down to twenty-one by the
end of January 31, 2005. Associated Press, Soon-to-be Vacated DI/FW Gates Get Atten-
tion from Competitors, supra note 171.
194 D/F' Press Release, Nov. 12, 2004, supra note 192.
195 Id.
196 Bajaj, Southwest creeping on D.C. radar, supra, note 3.
197 Torbenson, Southwest calling for repeal of Wright, supra note 170.
198 Id.
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Indeed, the limited capacity for air traffic at Love Field al-
ready sufficiently protects D/FW from the specter of any sub-
stantial competition. Even if the lifting of flight restrictions
would entice Southwest or other carriers to offer more service at
Love Field, the airport can only operate a maximum of 32
gates. 99 That is what the City of Dallas determined in an airport
Master Plan released in March 2001, taking into account the
limited airspace in the region and the level of acceptable air
traffic, noise and congestion. 20 The city started its Master Plan
study while competition at Love Field ascended toward its apex
in 2000, when the plan enthusiastically predicted further
growth.20 1 But since September 11, 2001, traffic at Love Field
has fallen by more than twenty percent, 20 2 and the volume will
drop even more. Southwest, the predominant carrier at Love
Field, has cut its daily flights from 128 to 117 in 2005.203 Thus,
any additional service prompted by the lifting of flight restric-
tions would likely bring a slow, incremental increase in air traf-
fic-first bringing flight levels back to pre-September 11 th levels
before hitting a maximum capacity. As one news report figured,
even if Southwest added eight to ten flights per day at each of its
nine currently-unused gates, it would still fly fewer than 200
flights per day.20 4 Southwest's Chief Executive Gary Kelly told
the Dallas Morning News that if the airline could fly unrestricted
from Love Field, he envisions offering service similar to what the
airline offers at Houston's Hobby airport.20 5 At Hobby, South-
west operates 141 daily flights, with a mix of both regional and
199 Dallas Love Field Master Plan, Final Executive Summary, March 3, 2001, availa-
ble at http://www.dallaslovefieldmasterplan.com/Information%2OUpdates.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
200 Id. at 1-3.
201 See id.
202 Eric Torbenson & Suzanne Marta, Southwest Rethinks Strategy Emerging Oppor-
tunities Prompt its Opposition to Wright Amendment, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 13,
2004, at DI.
203 Southwest Airlines' Top Ten Airports (as of May 4, 2005), available at http:/
/www.southwest.com/about-swa/press/factsheet.html#Top%20Ten%20Airports
(last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
204 The Dallas Morning News pointed out that Southwest has rights to twenty-
three gates at Love Field, but flies out ofjust fourteen. It noted that adding eight
to ten flights per day, per unused gate, would bring Southwest's total daily flights
to "less than 200," but at ten flights per day, per gate, Southwest would add ninety
flights, bringing its total daily flights to about 207. Eric Torbenson, Suzanne





long-distance routes. °1 Compare that to Southwest's 117 daily
departures from Dallas, and it seems hardly possible that such
an incremental increase in activity at Love Field could pose a
substantial threat to D/FW's financial stability. Thus, claims
that D/FW needs the Wright Amendment for its economic sur-
vival simply don't fly.
B. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT HOUSTON'S AIRPORTS
The way Southwest operates in Houston highlights just one of
the reasons Wright Amendment supporters should take a closer
look at Houston's successful two-airport system. When D/FW
officials learned of Southwest's plans to challenge the Wright
Amendment, Chief Operating Officer Kevin Cox said: "We be-
lieve that airline competition is good for the traveling public,
but competition by two airports that share some common own-
ership is not. '2 7 Yet the City of Houston has owned and simul-
taneously operated the two biggest airports south of Dallas
without any real complaints from travelers. The two-airport sys-
tem in Houston offers a fair model for comparison, since both
regions have similar economies and demographics. Both are sit-
uated in Texas, offering similar geographic convenience to air-
lines operating nationwide. Finally, the two airports in Houston
developed in a very similar fashion to D/FW and Love Field, but
they co-exist harmoniously without any flight restrictions.
Houston's Hobby Airport, like Dallas' Love Field, first started
operating in the early days of commercial aviation. 2°s Like Love
Field, Hobby sits close to downtown, just seven miles south of
the city's center.2 9 Like Love Field, major construction at
Hobby ended in the 1950s.2"' And like Love Field, Hobby has a
maximum capacity of thirty-two gates. 211 Of the thirty-two gates,
only twenty-four are currently in use. 212 In the 1960s, Houston
206 See Press Release, Southwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines Expands Nonstop
Flights Between Houston Hobby and Los Angeles International (Feb. 3, 2005),
available at http://www.southwest.com/about-swa/ press/ prindex.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2005).
207 D/FW Press Release, Nov. 12, 2004, supra note 192.
208 See History of Hobby Airport, available at http://hou.hoistonairportsys-
tem.org/about (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Hobby History].
209 See id.
210 Id.
211 See Press Release, Hobby Airport, Major Terminal Rebuilding Project for
Houston's Hobby Airport (June 15, 2000), available at http://v.hotIstonair-
portsystem.org/news/?id=6 (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
212 Id.
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city officials saw the need for a bigger and more modern airport,
so they built Houston Intercontinental Airport on the other side
of the city, about twenty-three miles north of downtown.2 13 As
with D/FW and Love Field, Houston city officials moved all pas-
senger airline service from Hobby to Intercontinental (now
named Bush Intercontinental) when the new airport opened for
business in 1969.214 But unlike what officials did to protect D/
FW, Houston never attempted to place flight restrictions on
Hobby. Passenger service did in fact end at Hobby for a few
years, from 1968 to 1971.215 In 1971, Southwest started operat-
ing out of Love Field, and it flew to Houston's older, smaller
Hobby Airport.216 That prompted a couple of other passenger
airlines to fly into Hobby, but they didn't stay long.2 1 7 Only
when the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 made it easier for
airlines to apply for service did competition return to Hobby.1
At one point, the airport had as many as twelve passenger carri-
ers offering service. 2 9 Today, seven airlines offer unrestricted
passenger service at Hobby.22 ° Combined, the airlines offer di-
rect, non-stop flights from Hobby to more than sixty-five cities
throughout the country.221 Simultaneously, at Bush Interconti-
nental, twenty-four passenger airlines fly 34-million passengers
each year.222 The airlines at Bush offer direct, non-stop flights
to 152 cities around the world.223 Both airports thrive and con-
tinue to grow. In fact, Houston proudly boasts that both air-
ports have financial self-sufficiency through enterprise funds
and do not "burden the local tax base for airport operations,
maintenance or capital improvements. ' 224 D/FW officials say
they do not want a repeal of the Wright Amendment to disturb
the harmonious co-existence of D/FW and Love Field, but
Houston's two-airport system provides good evidence that two
213 See History of Bush Intercontinental Airport, available at http://iah .hous-
tonairportsystem.org/about (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Bush
History].
214 Id.
215 See Hobby History, supra note 208.
216 Id.





222 Bush History, supra note 213.
223 Id.
224 See Hobby History, supra note 208; Bush History, supra note 213.
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airports with very different facilities can indeed serve one region
without any flight restrictions.
C. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT
When Wright Amendment supporters worry about competi-
tion between the two airports, what they really fear is competition
between airlines. If and when Congress lifts the flight restric-
tions at Love Field, the new service offered would probably not
come first from the airlines currently operating at D/FW, be-
cause it wouldn't make economic sense for an airline to run two
separate operations in the same city. Southwest contemplated
such a move when officials at D/FW urged the airline to take
over some of the gates abandoned by Delta's cut backs.2 2 5 But
after studying the opportunity, Southwest's Chief Executive Gary
Kelly said duplicating the structure Southwest has at Love Field
at D/FW would cost too much.226 For similar reasons, Southwest
recently announced it would cut all six of its daily flights at
Houston's Bush Intercontinental and operate in Houston exclu-
sively out of Hobby. " 7 Thus, additional service at Love Field
would likely come first from Southwest or other airlines moving
into the region for the first time, before drawing from existing
airlines at D/FW. That type of result does not put the airports
in direct competition, but rather the airlines. To compete, the
airlines may offer cheaper ticket prices, more flights per day or
more routes, which was precisely the goal Congress wanted to
achieve with the Airline Deregulation Act. The more airlines
compete, the more consumers benefit. Even D/FW's chief op-
erating officer Kevin Cox recognized this when he said
"[c]ompetition between airports won't get you lower cost ser-
vice; competition among airlines will. 228
As the situation stands, Dallas has one of the least competitive
airline markets in the nation. The monopoly over long-haul
flights granted to D/FW by the Wright Amendment has evolved
into a virtual monopoly on air travel to and from the region for
a single air carrier, American Airlines. In 2004, American and
its affiliate, American Eagle, operated more than 700 flights per
225 See Torbenson, Southwest rethinks strategy, supra note 202.
226 Id.
227 Press Release, Southwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines Discontinues Service
at Houston George Bush Intercontinental (Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://
www.southwest.con (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
228 Torbenson, Southwest calling for repeal of Wright, supra note 170.
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day out of D/FW.229 Its closest competitor at the airport was
Delta, which flew only 254 flights per day before it dismantled its
D/FW hub at the start of 2005, cutting down to just twenty-one
daily flights. 230 With Delta's departure, American's dominance
at D/FW will become even more pronounced. American an-
nounced in February that it planed to pick up the slack left by
Delta by adding 119 daily departures at D/FW, bringing its total
flights per day to 839 as of July 2005.21 As the Dallas Morning
News reported, that growth means American will fly more than
eighty percent of all air traffic at D/FW, "a concentration that
even airport officials admit is a 'monopoly. ' ' 2 2 The Depart-
ment of Transportation has a name for airports so dominated by
a single airline-"fortress hubs. ' 23 ' The term refers to airports
where the dominant carrier operates at least sixty percent of the
flights. 2 4 Only three airports hold that "fortress hub" distinc-
tion, according to DOT's Bureau of Transportation Statistics:
D/FW, and the airports in Cincinnati, Ohio, and Minneapolis,
Minnesota. As the term implies, "fortress hub" airlines, like
American, maintain their strongholds by walling out the compe-
tition. Southwest's chief executive, Gary Kelly, suggested that
American's stronghold on D/FW played a large part in South-
west's decision to not take over any of Delta's empty gates. "It's
called a fortress hub for a reason, '"235 he told the Dallas Morning
News. If the nation's most profitable and successful airline feels
it can't compete with American at its legislatively-protected
home turf, and the second biggest carrier at D/FW had to cede
the market to American's fortress hub, then how can consumers
reap the benefits of competition that Congress intended to
foster?
Even before American's latest expansion, its grip on the re-
gion's air traffic squeezed consumers with artificially inflated
229 See Press Release, American Airlines, American Airlines Bargain Fares Have
Driven Up D/FW Traffic By More Than 12 Percent (Feb. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.aa.com/content/amrcorp/pressReleases/2005_02/07_dffw.expan-
sion.jhtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) [hereinafter AA Press Release]. -
230 See Associated Press, Soon-to-be vacated D/FW Gates Get Attention from Competi-
tors, supra note 171.
231 AA Press Release, supra note 220.
232 Torbenson, Dispute Over Amendment Deep-rooted, supra note 204.
233 Fortress Hubs, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2003), available at http://
www.bts.gov/programs/economics-andfinance/airjtravel_pricejindex/2003_





ticket prices. According to American Express's eClipse Advisors,
a group that negotiates bulk travel discounts for businesses, the
lack of airline competition in Dallas puts the average business
airfare at $593, forty-eight percent higher than the $402 average
in North America."" A more specific study on the effect of the
Wright Amendment showed that, in 1996, D/FW airfares to or
from a state outside the Wright Amendment's restricted area
were seventy-six percent higher than airfares to or from a state
within the restricted area, even after adjustments for flight dis-
tances. 23 7 Even low-priced Southwest charged about fifteen per-
cent more on routes at Love Field than elsewhere. 23
Conversely, in the unrestricted markets where Southwest oper-
ates, even at airports where there's little competition, fares have
dropped by forty-seven percent since 19 78 .2 9 In unrestricted
markets where Southwest competes with other airlines, the
"Southwest Effect" has lowered fares by more than fifty-four per-
cent since 1978.240 All of these figures show the price consum-
ers have to pay when restrictions artificially limit competition on
routes, allowing single airlines to dominate.
Not only does the Wright Amendment hurt travelers to and
from Dallas, but studies show that limits on competition hurt
consumers nationwide. A working paper by three economists
called "Competition and Welfare in the U.S. Airline Industry"
shined an even harsher light on the dramatic difference be-
tween the impact of American and Southwest on the flying pub-
lic. 241 Using data from 1990 to 2000, Professor Steven Morrison
of Northeastern University and Clifford Winston and Vikram
Mahershri of the Brookings Institution evaluated the welfare
generated by an airline's entrance or exit from a market.24 2
236 Bajaj, Southwest Creeping on D.C. Radar, supra, note 3.
237 The Effect of Airport Restrictions on Air Fares: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Transp. and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 3-4 (1997)
(prepared statement of Steven A. Morrison, Professor of Economics, Northeast-
ern University). The statement points out that the savings may be overstated be-
cause the calculations presume that "Southwest-style" competition could be
offered on all domestic routes at D/FW if Congress repealed the Wright Amend-
ment. Id.
238 Id. at 4.
239 Morrison, Airline Deregulation, supra note 80, at 3.
240 Id.
241 Steven A. Morrison, Clifford Winston & Vikram Mahershri, Competition and
Welfare in the U.S. Airline Industry, (Feb. 2005) (unpublished working paper, cited
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They assessed "welfare" in terms of airfare and flight frequen-
cies, and took into account how other airlines react to the move-
ment of a given airline into or out of a market. 24 3 For example,
low-cost carriers like Southwest tend to increase flight services in
a market where large legacy carriers cut back, while the legacy
carriers like American tend to decrease service when other leg-
acy competitors drop out.244 As Dr. Winston explained to the
New York Times, "your value is in a sense determined by how re-
placeable you are. Or, more to the point, who are you keeping
out of markets? ' 245 The economists calculated that Southwest
Airlines contributed the most to consumer welfare, generating
$20 billion worth of value a year, while American Airlines actu-
ally lowered travelers' welfare. 246 Put another way, when South-
west responds to market changes, the services they offer benefit
consumers, while American's response to market forces hurts
consumers. 247 In fact, the study found that American's presence
in a market tends to raise the average ticket prices paid.248
Based on these calculations, the study calls for the government
to let free-market forces regulate the airline industry, instead of
providing financial subsidies, particularly to airlines that do not
contribute to the welfare of travelers.249 While the study never
mentioned the Wright Amendment, the flight restrictions now
amount to a government subsidy in favor of American Airlines,
because American, as the primary carrier at D/FW, essentially
has the exclusive right to operate long-distance flights into and
out of the region. Such a monopoly, propped up by legislative
action, sends a competition-stifling ripple effect across the air-
line industry that hurts consumers nationwide. Congress should
remove these barriers to competition by repealing the Wright
Amendment and allowing consumers to benefit from free mar-
ket forces.
In addition, local legislators should wake up to the economic
reality that the Wright Amendment hurts the region, and start
lobbying for its repeal, rather than its continuation. While flight
restrictions rob consumers of competitive choices in flight and
243 Id.
244 Id. at 25.
245 Virginia Postrel, Economic Scene; A Hurdle Faced by Southwest Airlines Shows
Drawbacks of Protectionist Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at C2.
246 See Competition and Welfare, supra note 241, at 3.
247 See id.




ticket prices, they cost the regional economy far more by mak-
ing the area less accessible to travelers and businesses. Yet local
politicians from the city to the state level have supported the
Wright Amendment over the years. In this latest round of de-
bates over the amendment, Dallas Mayor Laura Miller seems to
have settled upon supporting the Amendment. Yet, in inter-
views given to the media, she also seems to recognize the dam-
age the Wright Amendment wreaks upon Dallas. She described
to National Public Radio how Dallas' higher-than-average
airfares rob the region of visitors and convention business:
I went up to see Pfizer recently on a sales trip with the Conven-
tion and Visitors' Bureau in New York and I said, "You've gotta
come do more of your big meetings in Dallas. You meet con-
stantly, and you have salespeople all over the country." And they
said, "Well, we'd love to come to Dallas because it's in the middle
of the country, but, sorry, your airfares are too high, so we keep
going to Orlando because it's too expensive to fly to Dallas. 2
50
The mayors of Dallas have always juggled a delicate balance
between the city's interests in Love Field and D/FW. Dallas
wholly owns Love Field, where the now powerful Southwest Air-
lines keeps its headquarters, but Dallas also owns half of the
much larger D/FW Airport, where American, the biggest airline
in the world, is based. So, for now, the current mayor says she
supports keeping the Wright Amendment, but will work to at-
tract other low-cost carriers to D/FW to boost competition.25'
Yet, the mayor noted the challenge in that effort during a recent
meeting with American Airlines.
One of my questions for American was, "Let's say we're lucky and
we get a low-cost carrier to come out at D/FW. Will you crush
them like a bug, like you did at Love Field with Legend? Or will
they be allowed to live so that we can bring down airfares but
hopefully leave the status quo with Love Field? 252
Ironically, D/FW officials have accused Southwest of a similar
attempt to keep out low-fare competitors through a repeal of
the Wright Amendment. "The Wright Amendment has really
nothing to do with fares but everything to do with Southwest
trying to keep its monopoly at Love Field and trying to stymie
growth at D/FW Airport," said Kevin Cox, D/FW's chief operat-
'2511 Goodwyn, supra, note 86.
2.51 Crawling with Cynicism? DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 2005, at D2.
25 2 [d.
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ing officer.253 But the stifling of competition at D/FW occurred
long before Southwest announced plans to challenge the Wright
Amendment, as evidenced by American Airline's long-develop-
ing monopoly at the airport.
VI. CONCLUSION
What D/FW officials refuse to recognize is that no amount of
competition between airlines has ever caused the airport in a
major city to close. And the Wright Amendment smothers com-
petition between airlines, not airports. The Wright Amend-
ment's protectionist policy snuck past Congress in 1979 without
publicity. The flight restrictions helped D/FW grow into the na-
tion's third-busiest airport, and sheltered American from com-
petition as it grew into the world's largest airline. Those two
major players compose the loudest voices continuing to support
the Wright Amendment. Their predictions of economic disaster
at D/FW if Congress repeals the Wright Amendment hides their
ultimate self-serving desires to preserve the status quo-one in
which D/FW enjoys continued expansion under a monopoly on
long-haul flights, and American hopes to regain profitability
through its virtual monopoly on air service at D/FW. But
neither of those interests benefits the public. Through deregu-
lation, consumers now enjoy cheaper flights to more destina-
tions with more choices for carriers and flight times. But that
successful model for expanding the nation's airline industry fails
when special interests manipulate lawmakers into carving out
deregulation exceptions. Those exceptions are even more ob-
jectionable when they rest on shaky legal foundations. Congress
must recognize that both the airline industry and the Dallas-Fort
Worth region have changed tremendously over the past twenty-
five years. Whatever justified the Wright Amendment twenty-
five years ago, no longer flies today. The time has come for
Congress to put love back in the air by giving consumers true
competition through a repeal of the Wright Amendment.
253 Dallas Mayor Sticks with Wright Amendment, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE BUSINESS NEWS, Jan. 7, 2005.
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